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1. Introduction  
 
The severity of the recent financial and banking crises has led to significant analysis of the policies, 
costs and effectiveness of financial crisis intervention. Such research is warranted given the scale of 
public support. In the EU, for example, the contingent taxpayer support to stabilise financial 
institutions has amounted to 40 percent of GDP (€5.1 trillion) (European Commission, 2014). 
Measures to contain and resolve crises require political decisions. This paper provides a systematic 
analysis of some of the political dynamics of financial crisis management. Specifically, we analyse 
the impact political and party systems have on the fiscal cost of financial sector intervention. It thus 
aims to contribute to the growing literature on the public responses to banking crises (Laeven and 
Valencia, 2012a), as well as draw the relevant policy implications by giving some political, 
institutional and strategic context to our understanding of financial sector intervention in times of 
crisis. 
 
Using a data set of 147 systemic banking crises from 1970-2011, our empirical findings suggest that 
the fiscal costs of financial sector intervention are systematically associated with political economy 
factors. In particular we show how the institutional setting may condition the policy choice and mix in 
financial crises. Our empirical evidence also shows the channel by which these variables may interact 
by examining the policies different governments use in their strategies to manage financial crises. 
 
We start by first outlining the policy choices available to governments when managing systemic 
financial crises. We then review the literature on the political economy of crisis management and 
present our hypotheses. Following this, we present our data and research design for our analysis. We 
then discuss our results, after which we analyse the likelihood distinct types of governments adopt 
different tools in their crisis management strategy. 
 
2. Policy choice and financial crisis policy 
 
Financial crises have many causes. A collapse in asset prices can lead to contagion between credit 
institutions which affect funding, forcing banks to shed assets. This may depress prices further, 
causing a loss spiral (Brunnermeier et al, 2009). A sudden loss in creditor confidence can lead to 
deposit runs and widespread disruption to the payments system. Rising losses, higher haircuts and 
rapid deleveraging can cause widespread panic. Such dynamics may require government 
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intervention to stabilise financial markets and restore confidence in the financial system. Although no 
two crises are the same, financial crisis management can broadly be broken down into two stylised 
phases, containment and resolution (Honohan and Laeven, 2005). During the containment phase 
governments have a range of policy tools available. These have included inter alia liquidity support, 
deposit freezes and asset or liability guarantees. Once markets have stabilised, governments must 
move swiftly to the resolution phase and take a number of steps to re-establish debtor-creditor 
relationships, deal with debt overhangs or undercapitalisation. Policies here can include attaching 
conditionality to public support, early action on impaired assets (eg through asset management 
companies), strengthening resolution regimes to ensure swift resolution, reform of insolvency 
regimes to establish fast-track procedures, as well as the liquidation or sometimes nationalisation of 
credit institutions (Claessens et al, 2011). These are often combined in a different sequence and 
policy mix (Laeven and Valencia, 2010, 2012a, 2008b; Calomiris, Klingebiel and Laeven, 2004). 
 
How governments deal with crisis containment and resolution has varied significantly (see Figure 1). 
Swift restructuring following the Swedish crisis, for example, facilitated “economic adjustment and 
productivity growth, while in Japan the ‘zombification’ of banks contributed to a decade of stagflation 
during which productivity hardly improved” (Darvas, Pisani-Ferry and Wolff, 2013). Some suggest that 
“the more aggressive the government is in designing a rescue plan, the easier it is to force more 
restructuring in the financial sector, and the better the chances of leaving the surviving system 
stronger and less dependent on the taxpayer” (Geithner, 2014). However previous research has 
found that the use of accommodative policies adds significantly to the fiscal cost of crisis 
management (Honohan and Klingebiel, 2003; Claessens, Klingebiel and Laeven, 2005). These policy 
tools are often used in the containment phase to stem the panic from depositor runs, creditor runs (eg 
short-term unsecured lending), or margin runs (for collateralised funding markets), in response to a 
negative shock. 
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Figure 1: Variance in government response to banking crises (1970-2011) 
(a) Frequency of crisis response tools (b) Variation in the fiscal cost of crisis policy 
 
Source: Laeven and Valencia (2012a). 
 
Strategies that commit more fiscal resources, however, often lead to worse post-crisis economic 
performance and delayed recovery (Detragiache and Ho, 2010). This suggests that no trade-off 
appears to exist between the commitment of large fiscal resources and speedy crisis recovery. 
“Policies that are bad for fiscal soundness result in lower output growth and delayed recovery” 
(Detragiache and Ho, 2010, 17). Nonetheless, domestic political environment may condition the 
policy choices available to governments when managing financial crises. Therefore, political economy 
factors, or cross-national differences in political variables should be evident in the policy choice and 
hence fiscal costs of crisis management. 
 
3. The political economy of financial crisis policy: theory 
 
The political economy of finance literature highlights the impact political institutions have on the 
development of the financial system (Haber and Perotti, 2008; La Porta et al, 1997; Beck and Levine, 
2008). Much of the research on banking crises from the fields of economics and finance however 
does not take political variables into account. Furthermore, political economy and political science 
have much to understand about banking crises. There is a broad literature on the economic effects of 
constitutions for policymaking and performance (see Persson and Tabellini, 2005, for an overview). 
From a political economy perspective, institutions are “the rules of the game in a society or, more 
formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North, 1990, 3). 
Institutional approaches capture the ways in which institutions mediate domestic pressures through 
the distribution of veto players in the political system, or try to understand how different political 
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regimes select, structure and constrain decision-making. Formal rules translate preferences into 
policy outcomes and restrain incumbents from acting opportunistically (North and Weingast, 1989). 
 
Banking crises can result in recession, leading to lower investment, lower incomes and higher 
unemployment. Therefore, how governments choose to intervene in banking crises is quite important 
for the economic and fiscal cost, as well as the duration and subsequent recovery from the crisis. 
Containing a crisis can help prevent disorderly de-leveraging and allow time for balance sheet repair. 
However the use of certain policies to contain crises can also expose the state to significant 
contingent or direct liabilities. This was dramatically demonstrated by the 2008 decision by the Irish 
government to guarantee nearly all of the liabilities of the banking system. This ultimately forced 
them out of the bond markets and into an EU/IMF programme of adjustment. Intervention to contain a 
crisis, and restructure and resolve financial institutions, means allocating the costs of a crisis to 
certain groups in society. Such decisions can lead to distributional conflicts. Distributional conflicts 
and concerns about the consequences of macroeconomic policy can lead to powerful incentives to 
deviate from the most economically efficient outcomes (Walter, 2013, 227). For example a 
government may step in to guarantee liabilities in a bank or the banking system if they are concerned 
about capital outflows. However, depending on the location of creditors and the scope of government 
support, political cleavages can emerge – between domestic debtors and creditors and often more 
controversially between domestic debtors and foreign creditors (Pepinsky, 2014, 10-13). Moreover, 
taxpayer support to the financial sector can present an opportunity cost for governments. This can 
result from an increased cost of borrowing if direct or contingent support results in the state paying 
higher interest rates on government debt, or a reduction in the provision of public goods from fiscal 
austerity due to taxpayer support to financial institutions. Finally, intervention may create perverse 
incentives, aggravate moral hazard and even delay recovery. 
 
Previous empirical research suggests democratic regimes differ from autocratic states in their 
propensity towards bailouts (Rosas, 2006). That politicians are less likely to engage in bailouts under 
democratic regimes suggests that electoral accountability is an important determinant of crisis 
response. Chwieroth and Walter (2010) find financial crises are generally associated with higher rates 
of political turnover. However, Crespo-Tenorio, Jensen and Rosas (2014) examining the patterns of 
incumbent survival following banking crises, find that although “democratic governments with several 
veto players are systematically less secure in their tenure than democratic governments with fewer 
veto players, both in the presence and in the absence of banking crises”, no differences in survival 
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times of incumbents under banking crises are evident. In explaining this result they propose that 
although multiple veto players may limit ‘clarity of responsibility’, they may also constrain the ability 
of governments to enact policies in response to banking crises. Such constraints are the subject of 
this paper. The success of financial sector intervention also depends heavily on effective legal, 
regulatory and political institutions. Better institutional development (including the quality of 
institutions, less corruption and efficient judicial systems) are also associated with faster economic 
recovery (Claessens, Klingebiel and Laeven, 2005). 
 
3.1 Veto players 
 
A veto player is an individual or collective of actors that have to agree for a policy to change Tsebelis 
(1995). Tsebelis (1995) seminal analysis explains how every political system has a configuration of 
veto players either specified in a country’s constitution – ‘institutional veto players’, or by the political 
system – ‘partisan veto players’. From a theoretical perspective a number of models explore why 
crises and veto players are associated with inaction, delay and sub-optimal outcomes (see 
Sturzenegger and Tommasi, 1998; Drazen, 2000; Drazen and Easterly, 2001, for an overview). Drazen 
and Grilli (1993, 2) suggest “crises may be necessary to induce significant reform because of 
distributional implications of large policy changes. Drastic but necessary policy changes are resisted 
[however] because economic participants believe someone else can be forced to bear the burden of 
change”. Alesina and Drazen (1991) use a ‘war of attrition’ model to explain how conflict over the 
known costs (although information is asymmetric) of macroeconomic stabilisation leads to delays.1
 
 
Only when one group concedes is the policy adopted. Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) model how 
uncertainty regarding the distribution of gains and losses from reform can lead to a bias against 
efficiency enhancing reforms (and towards the status quo) when winners and losers cannot be 
identified ex ante. Laban and Sturzenegger (1994, 273), who model the status quo bias in a dynamic 
context, conclude that “only an extreme crisis, eg an economic crisis, may trigger the necessary 
political consensus for reform”. 
MacIntyre (2001) proposes that an intermediate concentration of veto players is optimal in a crisis. 
He deduces, from his analysis of the response to the Asian financial crisis, that a U-shaped 
relationship between policy stability and rigidity exists. A smaller number of veto players can lead to a 
                                                          
1 “In the basic war of attrition model from biology, two animals are fighting over a prize. Fighting is costly, and the fight 
ends when one animal drops out, with the other gaining the prize” (Alesina and Drazen, 1991,9). 
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risk of policy volatility, uncertainty and a lack of credibility in the government’s response. The larger 
the number of veto players, the greater the risk of policy rigidity. This can lead governments to be 
unable to deal with mounting vulnerabilities. Angkinand and Willett (2008) provide some empirical 
evidence to support this proposition, with regard to the magnitude of output loss for crises in 
emerging market economies. When controlling for competitive elections, Keefer (2007) however, 
finds no relationship between veto players and outcomes. 
 
We also test for the impact of veto players in our analysis below. Theory suggests a larger number of 
veto players will lead to policy rigidity. If policy rigidity occurs due to a larger number of veto players, 
such governments may not be able to agree on policies which fiscally expose the state when 
managing financial crises, thus limiting the fiscal burden on the state. 
 
Hypothesis 1: A larger number of veto players are associated with lower fiscal costs of financial crisis 
management. 
 
Veto players theory is an attempt to overcome long classified systems of government, but given the 
limited evidence to date, we also explore other political factors which may condition policy choice in 
financial crisis management. In the political economy literature two particular features that have 
attracted considerable attention are (i) the form of government and (ii) electoral rules. “Politicians 
make policy choices, but their specific electoral incentives and powers to propose, amend, veto and 
enact economic policies hinge on the rules for election, legislation, and execution” (Persson and 
Tabellini, 2005, 11). The next section will discuss these in turn. 
 
3.2 Constitutional rules: parliamentary vs. presidential 
 
In modern democracies, two broad forms of government exist: (i) parliamentary systems; and (ii) 
presidential systems2
                                                          
2 Hybrid systems also exist. For example, the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al, 2001, 2012) also includes a 
category 'assembly elected President'. However given the similarity in the classification criteria (based on Shugart 
and Carey, 1992) and the low number of observations, for the purpose of this analysis, we include these in 
parliamentary systems and limit the categories to parliamentary and presidential. 
. These forms of government define the constitutional relationship between the 
executive and the legislature and are distinct based on the unification or separation of powers. How 
both types of institutions shape decision-making and economic outcomes has received much 
attention in both comparative politics and political economy literatures. Put simplistically, 
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presidential regimes have a stronger separation of powers whereas parliamentary regimes are 
associated with a greater concentration of powers (Persson and Tabellini, 2005). 
 
Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997) model this relationship and show that the separation of powers 
under presidential systems improves the accountability of elected officials. The “separation of powers 
between executive and legislative bodies ... helps to prevent the abuse of power, but only with 
appropriate checks and balances. Checks and balances work by creating a conflict of interest 
between the executive and the legislature, yet requiring both bodies to agree on public policy. In this 
way, the two bodies discipline each other to the voters’ advantage. Under appropriate checks and 
balances, separation of powers also helps the voters elicit information” (Persson, Roland and 
Tabellini, 1997, 1163). 
 
Lijphart (1999, 117) explains this by outlining three key differences between presidential and 
parliamentary forms of government: (i) in parliamentary systems the head of government is 
dependent on the confidence of the legislature, whereas in a presidential system the head of 
government (president) is normally elected for a prescribed period and normally cannot be forced to 
resign through a vote of no confidence; (ii) presidents are popularly elected directly or by a college, 
whereas prime ministers are selected by legislatures; and (iii) parliamentary systems have a collegial 
cabinet whereas presidential systems effectively have a one-person executive. These crucial features 
of different forms of government mean that in presidential systems voters can keep more direct 
control of the executive and it is more accountable. In parliamentary systems the executive is only 
indirectly accountable to the voters, and is directly accountable to the legislature (see Persson, 
Roland and Tabellini, 1997, 1167-192). Finally, in parliamentary regimes, both the policy initiative 
and agenda setting roles rely on the support of the parliament (Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 2000, 
1125). Maintaining this power of agenda setting induces ‘legislative cohesion’ in parliamentary 
systems which further concentrates power (Diermeier and Feddersen, 1998, Huber, 1996). These 
dynamics mean the different forms of government are associated with very different policy 
outcomes. In presidential systems for example, the capacity for change decreases (Tsebelis, 1995). 
Presidential systems are associated with fewer rents for politicians (Persson and Tabellini, 1999, 
Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 2000). “Separation of powers in the congressional regime produces a 
smaller government, with less waste and less redistribution but also inefficiently low spending on 
public goods. Intuitively, separation of powers enables the voters to discipline the politicians, and this 
reduces waste and moderates the tax burden . . . legislative cohesion in the parliamentary regime, on 
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the other hand, leads to a larger government, with more taxation and more waste, but also more 
spending on public goods and redistribution benefiting a broader group of voters. Intuitively, there is 
now more scope for collusion among politicians, which increases waste and taxation. But policy aims 
to please a majority group of voters, which increases public-good provision, calls for a more equal 
redistribution, and makes the majority support a high level of taxation” (Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 
2000, 1126). In line with this literature, with respect to financial crisis management, Detragiache and 
Ho (2010) have found that parliamentary systems are more likely to engage in policies that put more 
fiscal resources at risk3
 
. 
3.3 Electoral rules: single party vs. coalition government 
 
Electoral rules shape the number of parties, government formation and hence policy choice. This has 
been well established in the political science literature (see for example Taagepera and Shugart, 
1989). The first key political factor which influences this is the electoral formula which translates 
votes into seats. The two basic classes of electoral formula that are usually considered are: (i) 
plurality rule, associated with ’winner take all’ systems; and (ii) proportional representation, whereby 
the number of seats (and spoils of office) are, to variant degrees, proportionally allocated according 
to vote share (see Cox, 1990). Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2007, 1) model how a more fragmented 
party system and a larger incidence of coalition governments are induced under proportional 
electoral systems than under plurality rule. Proportional systems, via coalition governments 
therefore can constrain policy choice. 
 
The second key political factor which influences this is the district magnitude which is the number of 
seats to be filled in a district (Cox, 1990). “One polar case is that all legislators are elected in a single 
district. Larger districts diffuse electoral competition, inducing parties to seek support from broad 
coalitions in the populations. Smaller districts steer electoral competition towards narrower 
geographical constituencies” (Persson and Tabellini, 2005, 22). 
 
Single-party and coalition governments differ in respect to the size of public spending due to an 
‘electoral common pool problem’ because voters can differentiate between parties in a coalition but 
                                                          
3 Using a sample of 40 crisis episodes, Detragiache and Ho (2010, 7) construct a policy response index (whereby 
policies that shift the burden of the crisis from bank stakeholders to the government receive a score of one, while 
policies that do not commit public funds receive a score of minus one) and instrument the political system to 
measure the effect on output growth and crisis duration. 
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not between factions of a single-party at the polls (see Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 2007). Persson, 
Roland and Tabellini (2007) show that “the indirect effects of electoral rules — on the number of 
parties and the type of government — are essential to the finding that majoritarian elections lead to 
less public spending than proportional elections”. A significant body of empirical research confirms 
this (see for example Bräuninger, 2005, Lizzeri and Persico, 2001, Rickard, 2012). The difference in 
the number of parties also impact policy through the accountability channel. “A single party in 
government is accountable for all of its policy decisions since it must promote the collective interest 
of a broad support base if it wants to keep its majority ... [p]articipants in multiparty coalition 
governments, by contrast, are held primarily responsible for only a subset of policy decisions: those 
in the policy areas in which they have the biggest stake. This difference in electoral accountability... 
results in systematic differences in policy decisions” (Bawn and Rosenbluth, 2006, 251). 
 
Putting the constitutional rules and electoral rules together for the purposes of this research, we 
derive four broad categories of government: (i) single-party parliamentary systems; (ii) multiparty 
parliamentary systems; (iii) single-party presidential systems; and (iv) multiparty presidential 
systems. So what could we expect for financial crisis management? Presidential systems are more 
accountable to the electorate than parliamentary systems due to the separation of powers. This is 
because even “presidents in multiparty systems who do not have to seek majority party support in 
congress have a far less incentive to seek and maintain lasting coalitions in congress than do 
parliamentary executives” (Shugart and Carey, 1992, 33). In financial crisis management, we can 
deduce that presidential governments are less likely to put fiscal resources at risk, thus resulting in 
lower losses to the state. 
 
Similarly, because single-party governments are accountable for all policy decisions, multiparty 
governments are more likely to strike less efficient decisions in financial crisis management. This, for 
example, could include providing a guarantee on assets or liabilities which does not immediately 
draw on fiscal resources of the state, but could end up very costly later on. Multi-party coalitions also 
have multiple interests to serve so could use other fiscally costly policies such as bank 
recapitalisation or spare creditors and depositors losses - both resulting in higher cumulative fiscal 
costs from managing a banking crisis. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Presidential systems with single-party government are associated with less fiscal 
costs from financial crisis management when compared with other forms of government. 
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 3.4 What other political factors could affect the fiscal costs of crisis management? 
 
Electioneering incentives may also play a role in the policy choices in the management of financial 
crises and thus impact fiscal costs. Nordhaus (1975) presents a simple adaptive- expectations model 
of intertemporal choice between economic objectives, which captures well the incentive for 
opportunistic politicians to manipulate policy. Elections induce a ‘political business cycle’. His model 
predicts that office seeking politicians will maximise the probability of re-election by stimulating the 
economy in advance of an election. Similarly, Tufte (1980) proposes that politicians will manipulate 
policies such as transfer payments or tax cuts prior to an election, as voters reward good economic 
performance. 
 
A second field of political economy general equilibrium models include rational expectations and 
predict smaller less regular cycles (Rogoff and Sibert, 1988, Rogoff, 1990). Persson and Tabellini 
(1990) argue that following an exogenous macroeconomic shock, voters retrospectively rationally 
evaluate the incumbents’ performance in managing stabilisation, given control of policies and 
privileged information. Better performance leads to a higher probability of re-election. Whilst empirical 
evidence for office-seeking electoral cycles is inconsistent, that incumbents benefit from favourable 
macroeconomic conditions has unequivocal support (Franzese Jr, 2002). We therefore also test for 
the impact that electoral cycles have in financial crisis management. 
 
Finally partisanship may impact financial crisis policy. Constructivists have shown how discursive 
practices can generate a narrative structure for policy formation and could shape containment or 
resolution strategies. “Successful discursive attacks on Asian model practices, coupled with the 
severe economic effects of the crisis, generated a normative environment for policy formation, that 
severely constrained resistance to the radical restructuring of the institutional and legal framework of 
the Korean economy than would otherwise have been expected” (Hall, 2003, 95). Constructivist 
approaches to political economy do not accept that beliefs are reducible to a priori interests, rather for 
example, treat party leaders as “ideational entrepreneurs who actively modify agents’ beliefs about 
what their interests are” (Blyth, 2003, 698). Crises and responses only make sense in terms of the 
way ideas are used to diagnose the problem and reduce uncertainty (Blyth, 2002, 253). Therefore, 
the political prominence of certain societal groups may be translated into policy preferences through 
political parties which ideologically represent them (Stasavage, 2007). This may in turn condition the 
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policy response. Broz (2013), for example, argues that a partisan-policy financial cycle exists 
whereby right wing (pro-market) governments preside over financial booms, while left-wing 
governments are left to govern over the crash. Without deriving specific hypotheses, we also test for 
the impact partisanship may have on financial crisis management. 
 
The next section will explain in detail our data and method of investigation. 
 
4. Data and research design 
 
Econometric analysis to examine the relationships between political institutions, financial crisis 
management, and economic outcomes is limited by the number of crises and the availability of 
detailed policy and outcome data. The recent financial crisis however has led to an increased number 
of observations, particularly among advanced economies and democracies. This larger sample size 
allows us to more accurately estimate the interplay between political-economy factors and the fiscal 
cost of financial crisis management. In order to test the hypotheses above, we make use of the 
updated Systemic Banking Crises database constructed by Laeven and Valencia (2012a, 2010, 
2008a). This database contains detailed information on all systemic banking crises from 1970-2011 
– totalling 147 episodes. We merged this dataset with the World Bank database of political 
institutions 2012 (Beck et al, 2001, 2012), which is a balanced panel dataset comprising several 
institutional and political variables for 178 countries over the period 1975-2012. 
 
Laeven and Valencia provide data on several variables describing the various banking crises. Of 
particular interest to our research question are the fiscal costs associated with a particular crisis 
episode. Laeven and Valencia define fiscal costs as gross fiscal outlay directed to the restructuring of 
the financial sector. However, they exclude liquidity assistance from the treasury but this is included 
in the measure for liquidity support. The focus on gross, rather than net, fiscal costs in our analysis is 
due to the fact that the former better captures the ‘intensity of the intervention’ (Laeven and Valencia, 
2012a, 5). The depth of the crisis will likely affect both the policy decisions and the fiscal costs. In 
order to correct for this aspect, we produced a measure of the crisis depth, defined as the gap 
between real GDP growth at year t-1 (before the crisis) and the local minimum growth rate during the 
crisis period. 
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We use our event-based dataset to test whether political characteristics have an impact on the gross 
fiscal outlay resulting from a banking crisis. Following previous literature we first look at veto players 
as a raw variable. To do this we take three measures of veto players. Firstly, we use the checks and 
balances variable Checks and balances (DPI) taken from the World Bank database of political 
institutions (DPI) (Beck et al, 2001, 2012). This is measured on a scale from 1-7 and takes into 
account the number of veto players and the effectiveness of electoral competitiveness in the political 
system. A higher value indicates more checks and balances (see appendix for full description). 
Secondly, we use an index provided by Henisz (2002) which assigns a score based on effective veto 
points Political constraints index. It also uses a simple spatial model of political interaction to derive 
the extent to which any one political actor, or their replacement, is constrained in their choice of future 
policies. Finally, following Keefer (2007), we take the residual of the regression of the checks and 
balances variable on competitive elections Checks residual to isolate the effect of veto players. This is 
because the checks and balances variable captures both the extent to which countries have 
competitive elections and the number of veto players (see Keefer, 2007, 22). 
 
To capture whether the country has a competitive political system, we use the Legislative Index of 
Electoral Competitiveness LIEC provided in Beck et al (2001, 2012). This is a scale from 1-7 (see 
appendix for full construction). On the basis of this scale, and following Beck et al (2001, 2012), we 
take democracies as LIEC >4. We then look at the categories of political system defined in section 4.2 
above. Taking single-party parliamentary systems as a baseline, we create dummy variables for 
Presidential system – single-party, Presidential system – multi-party, and Parliamentary system – 
multi-party. To explore possible effects of other political variables, we measure the Years to the next 
election and examining the role of partisanship, our variable Government orientation refers to the 
governing parties’ ideological orientation with respect to economic policy. Left captures parties that 
are defined as communist, socialist, social democratic, or left-wing. Centrist parties cover those that, 
for example, advocate strengthening private enterprise in a social-liberal context. Whereas right 
captures those defined as conservative, Christian democratic, or right-wing. Political variables, which 
we use from the World Bank database of political institutions (Beck et al, 2001, 2012), are taken at 
time t, the first crisis year. This might seem somewhat reductive, as crises protract for several years, 
with variables such as government partisanship changing throughout. However, because 
accommodative policies associated with large fiscal costs (such as asset or liability guarantees for 
example) are usually employed during the containment phase (see discussion above), we think that 
this is not an unreasonable assumption. 
13
 We control for a range of macroeconomic and political variables. Liquidity support captures in 
percentage points the increase in central bank claims on financial institutions over deposits and 
foreign liabilities. Monetary expansion is computed as the change in the monetary base between its 
peak during the crisis and its level one year prior to the crisis as a percentage of GDP. Credit is a 
measure of domestic credit as a share of GDP, averaged over three pre-crisis years, and, in line with 
the literature, here used as a proxy for the size of the financial sector. Credit boom is a dummy which 
takes the value of 1 if there was a credit boom before the crisis, as defined by Dell’Ariccia, Igan and 
Laeven (2012). We also control for GDP per capita, and whether the country is a member of the OECD. 
Banking crises often do not happen in isolation. We therefore control for a Concurrent currency crisis 
and Concurrent sovereign debt crisis (see appendix for a full list and construction of variables used). 
 
Aside from determining which political characteristics are associated with higher fiscal costs, as a 
second step, we exploit the data to try and determine the channel through which this effect takes 
place. In this regard, the Laeven and Valencia database provides detailed information on many of the 
policies employed during a crisis for a subset of 65 episodes. Bank guarantee, for example, indicates 
whether or not the authorities introduced a blanket guarantee on deposits (and possibly other 
liabilities). Depositor losses tell us whether the country imposed losses on depositors when 
managing their crisis. Similarly, Bank recapitalisation further tells us if the governments in question 
recapitalised their banks as part of their strategy for financial crisis management. 
 
Before turning to the results of our quantitative analysis, we assembled some descriptive statistics of 
our institutional variables. Table 1 below details the number of observations, mean, standard 
deviation, minimum and maximum, for the set of selected political variables which fed into our 
quantitative exercise. It shows that although single-party presidential systems represent a majority of 
crisis episodes (44.8 percent), our sample is not excessively skewed, and this will be particularly 
important for our econometric analysis below. 37 governments are characterised as left-wing, 35 as 
right-wing and 17 as centrist. Non-OECD members represented a majority, with 117 observations, 
against 29 OECD-member banking crises. In general, looking at the time distribution of the financial 
crises we see that they present an unprecedented spike in 2008. A large number of the OCED 
members form part of the latest 2008 financial crisis. 
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Table 1: Institutional characteristics - descriptive statistics 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Checks and balances 139 2.697 0.890 1 7 
Political constraints index 147 0.250 0.230 0 0.7069 
Years to next election 139 1.916 1.611 0 7 
Snap election 142 0.309 0.620 0 3 
Government orientation 89 2.022 0.904 1 3 
Legislative Index of Electoral Competition 142 5.306 2.177 1 7 
Presidential-single-party 147 0.448 0.499 0 1 
Presidential-multiparty 147 0.170 0.376 0 1 
Parliamentary-multiparty 147 0.156 0.364 0 1 
 
This analysis however is necessarily limited by the data. Firstly, turning to crisis duration, we highlight 
a major limitation of the Laeven and Valencia database. Whilst a systemic banking crisis is deemed 
over whenever the conditions are no longer fulfilled (detailed in appendix), a crisis is also considered 
terminated after five years, regardless of economic or financial circumstances. This is depicted in 
Table 2 below, with a spike in the five-year crises. Whereas fiscal costs may protract further over time, 
the most severe contractions in GDP tend to be experienced in the early years of a crisis. Therefore we 
expect this to be less of a problem and not to directly encroach on the robustness of our analysis. 
 
Table 2: Frequency distribution of crisis duration 
Crisis Duration Frequency 
1 38 
2 16 
3 19 
4 10 
5 64 
 
Secondly, and connected to the first point, the crisis is still on-going in some of the countries in our 
sample. However, our unit of analysis is gross (rather than net) fiscal cost to capture the ‘intensity of 
the intervention’ associated with political economy factors. Therefore it should reasonably estimate 
the impact political economy factors have on gross fiscal costs for on-going crises. Thirdly, fiscal cost 
is but one measure of the ‘costs of crises’. Our analysis does not capture the output a country loses 
from a crisis, or indeed the social cost associated with the crisis or the fiscal intervention. These may 
be more effectively captured using other metrics. Furthermore, whilst our results show relationships 
between certain political variables and gross fiscal costs, our analysis does not attempt to estimate 
the effectiveness of the fiscal intervention on economic performance or crisis duration. Despite these 
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limitations, the Laeven and Valencia dataset provides the best comparable data for the fiscal costs of 
crisis management. 
 
5. Empirical evidence 
 
Table 3 shows the results of our basic analysis of the effect that veto players have on the gross fiscal 
cost of financial sector intervention in times of crisis. In line with previous empirical findings (Keefer, 
2007; Crespo-Tenorio, Jensen and Rosas, 2014), we do not find any evidence for an effect of veto 
players on the fiscal costs of crisis management. Therefore, using these raw metrics for checks and 
balances, no effect on the government response is visible from the data. To better understand how 
political institutions may impact fiscal costs, we must therefore analyse other political variables. 
 
The main regression results for this paper are given in Table 4. This shows the impact variant political 
systems, derived above, have on the gross fiscal costs of financial crisis management. We find 
significant evidence to suggest that both single-party and multiparty presidential systems are 
associated with lower gross fiscal costs. Given no effect was found for the impact of veto players, this 
suggests that a deeper comparative analysis of the form of government is necessary to capture how 
political institutions impact policy choice following shocks. In line with hypothesis 2, this suggests 
that the separation of powers leads to less fiscal resources being put at risk, and hence less fiscal 
costs. Given governments in these systems can be held more easily to account by voters; they may 
be less likely to use policies which expose the state when managing financial banking crises. 
 
This effect holds when controlling for GDP per capita, liquidity support from the central bank, and size 
of the financial sector. The coefficients are stable across a number of specifications. The results 
should also be consistent across banking crises as we also control for the severity of the crisis. 
Furthermore, all regression specifications are run using standard errors that are robust to 
heteroskedasticity. These results also confirm similar findings which look at the broad impact of 
political systems on economic performance and crisis duration (Detragiache and Ho, 2010). It is 
worth recalling that we are not suggesting presidential systems are ‘better’ at managing financial 
crises. Our analysis does not examine the effectiveness of the intervention which may be better 
analysed through other metrics such as output loss or crisis duration. We do however show robust 
results to suggest that political institutions condition policy choice in response to shocks. 
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Models (4)-(12) use democracies only. This is important as the political economy variables and 
underlying accountability theory we have outlined can only fully play out in a democratic context. We 
find no robust evidence for a political-business cycle - the significance of Years to the next election in 
Model (2) is the result of an outlier (Chile 1982). Excluding this data point no evidence was found. 
Furthermore, we find no evidence that partisanship affects the fiscal costs of financial sector 
intervention. 
 
This section has looked at the impact select political variables have on the fiscal costs of crisis 
management. Finding that certain political characteristics are associated with higher fiscal costs is 
interesting, but identifying the channel through which this happens bridges an important gap in the 
literature for our understanding of the political economy of crisis management. To explore our 
hypotheses and results in more detail we will now look at the channels by which this might occur. This 
next section will therefore look at the likelihood that variant governments use policies for crisis 
management which put public resources at risk. 
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Table 3: Regression results for veto players and fiscal costs of banking crises 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Political constraints index   -9.422   -12.09 -18.60 -9.583 -21.61 -16.10 4.285 
    (7.229)   (8.313) (12.84) (17.54) (13.23) (15.15) (11.06) 
Drop in GDP         0.448 0.287 0.244 0.235 0.291 
          (0.270) (0.325) (0.301) (0.321) (0.332) 
Concurrent currency crisis         9.895** 7.193 10.34** 5.439 2.126 
          (4.736) (4.736) (4.444) (5.032) (4.596) 
Concurrent sovereign debt crisis         -9.874 -6.953 -9.059 -7.680   
          (7.157) (8.118) (6.648) (7.921)   
Credit boom           5.863* 4.558 6.762* 6.363** 
            (3.337) (3.610) (3.689) (3.085) 
NPL         0.102 0.224*   0.332** 0.498*** 
          (0.159) (0.127)   (0.143) (0.138) 
Years to the next election           1.699       
            (1.053)       
LIEC           -2.532       
            (2.292)       
Credit           -0.000* -0.000** -0.001**   
            (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
GDP per capita       -0.008 0.054   0.091 0.116   
        (0.084) (0.083)   (0.118) (0.091)   
Checks and balances DPI -0.865                 
  (1.039)                 
Checks residual     0.005             
      (1.400)             
Government orientation                 0.011 
                  (2.262) 
Constant 15.29*** 15.47*** 12.47*** 16.87*** 10.73 19.42 12.10* 4.272 -4.226 
  (3.909) (3.097) (1.506) (3.392) (7.245) (13.49) (6.045) (7.573) (9.178) 
Observations 86 87 86 84 59 55 55 53 45 
R-squared 0.011 0.023 0.000 0.038 0.309 0.500 0.245 0.360 0.440 
Democracies only NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table  4: Regression results for political institutions and fiscal costs of banking crises 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Presidential system-single-party -7.218 -6.735 -10.53** -11.36** -11.18** -13.42** -11.27** -11.29** -11.10** -12.25** -12.79** -8.727* 
  (5.396) (5.227) (5.179) (5.453) (5.104) (6.170) (4.816) (5.137) (4.969) (5.150) (5.536) (4.409) 
Presidential system-multiparty -11.36* -11.03* -10.84* -12.25* -11.98* -14.89** -11.27** -11.38* -11.48** -12.23** -11.93* -9.343* 
  (5.868) (5.768) (5.903) (6.305) (5.995) (7.289) (5.379) (5.892) (5.622) (5.603) (6.076) (5.463) 
Parliamentary system-multiparty -7.229 -7.246 -6.721 -7.729 -7.615 -6.381 -7.659 -6.687 -8.576 -8.462 -8.864 -5.281 
  (5.048) (5.037) (5.403) (4.979) (5.582) (5.043) (5.187) (5.616) (5.437) (5.558) (5.752) (5.135) 
Years to next election   2.300**                     
    (0.995)                     
Drop in GDP 0.446 0.441 0.275 0.253 0.275 0.206 0.172 -0.034 0.004 0.133 0.224 0.149 
  (0.281) (0.270) (0.253) (0.257) (0.268) (0.276) (0.295) (0.271) (0.300) (0.290) (0.365) (0.313) 
Concurrent currency crisis 13.11*** 13.71*** 11.34*** 11.16** 11.07*** 10.65** 11.00** 9.744* 11.93** 10.92** 10.19** 6.806 
  (4.086) (3.856) (3.940) (4.275) (4.091) (4.239) (4.439) (5.057) (4.625) (4.484) (4.629) (5.342) 
Concurrent sovereign debt crisis -2.698 -2.123 -1.507 -1.358 -1.404 -1.046 -1.870 4.668 -2.363 -1.768 2.482 -2.105 
  (6.183) (6.838) (6.015) (6.087) (6.058) (6.060) (5.392) (5.106) (5.442) (5.437) (4.721) (6.192) 
LIEC     -2.918                   
      (2.038)                   
GDP per capita       -0.011                 
        (0.093)                 
Credit         -0.000* -0.001*             
          (0.000) (0.000)             
OECD           -4.808             
            (5.037)             
Credit boom             3.823 5.574 3.293 3.703 2.688 5.798 
              (3.410) (3.536) (3.549) (3.479) (3.691) (3.663) 
Government orientation               -1.949         
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                (2.339)         
Snap election                 2.543       
                  (2.574)       
Liquidity support                   0.004     
                    (0.062)     
Monetary expansion                     -0.177   
                      (0.476)   
NPL                       0.279* 
                        (0.161) 
Constant 10.75** 6.399 32.59** 13.82** 13.49*** 17.00** 12.21** 16.50** 12.96** 13.41** 14.21** 6.290 
  (4.601) (4.901) (14.88) (5.851) (4.971) (6.863) (4.687) (6.287) (4.970) (5.339) (6.252) (4.793) 
Observations 62 61 61 58 58 58 56 46 55 55 51 54 
R-squared 0.297 0.383 0.354 0.280 0.284 0.300 0.295 0.285 0.311 0.301 0.300 0.379 
Democracies only NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses                       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                         
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6. Policies for financial crisis management 
 
To identify the channels by which political variables impact fiscal costs, we deploy a two-stage 
approach. In the first stage we identify the impact of specific policies for crisis management (bank 
guarantees, losses imposed on depositors, and bank recapitalisations) have on fiscal costs. In the 
second stage, we run a number of regressions to see whether certain political systems are more 
conducive to adopting specific policies when managing financial crises. The use of any particular 
policy to manage crises entails a trade-off for the governments. Certain tools are useful to avoid 
contagion, stem depositor withdrawals or contain capital flight, cleanse balance sheets of non-
performing loans (NPLs), or stimulate credit flow to business. However they each expose the state to 
direct fiscal costs which they may or may not recoup later, or to contingent liabilities which may be 
called upon. This is illustrated in Figure 2 which shows the variance in fiscal costs associated with the 
use of two different policies for crisis management. 
 
Figure 2: Variance in fiscal costs associated with bank guarantees and bank recapitalisations 
 
(a) Bank guarantees (b) Bank recapitalisations 
 
Source: Laeven and Valencia (2012a) 
 
Blanket guarantees, if credible, can help restore depositor confidence. However they may increase 
fiscal costs if called upon, or indirectly by exacerbating the risky behaviour of banks (Laeven and 
Valencia, 2008b, 15). Using public money to recapitalise a bank can facilitate lending to the real 
economy. Homar and van Wijnbergen (2013), for example, find that bank recapitalisations 
substantially reduce crisis duration. However if a recapitalised bank turns out to be insolvent, the 
state may end up losing its investment. Finally, imposing losses on depositors, whilst politically 
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unpopular, often spares the state from having to bailout a bank. However depositor losses could also 
lead to further deposit withdrawals without capital controls. 
 
Table 5 shows the results for the impact different crisis management policies have on the fiscal costs 
of financial crisis management. Reasonably robust results show that the use of bank guarantees and 
bank recapitalisations are significantly associated with higher fiscal costs. This is in line with previous 
empirical work on the subject (Honohan and Klingebiel, 2003, Laeven and Valencia, 2012b). This data 
is binary in nature and therefore very imprecise. Nonetheless it is encouraging that we found robust 
evidence to support our empirical analysis above. We did not find any significant evidence for an 
effect of depositor losses on fiscal costs. This could be because only 13 cases in our dataset imposed 
losses on depositors and half of these losses were considered minor to moderate (Laeven and 
Valencia, 2008a, see table 8). 
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Table 5: The impact of different policies on the fiscal costs of crisis management 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Bank guarantee 7.512** 7.562** 8.055* 10.01* 
  (3.048) (3.103) (4.522) (5.183) 
Depositor losses 2.387 1.490 1.597 0.796 
  (4.190) (4.859) (4.842) (5.100) 
Bank recapitalisation 7.489* 5.237* 5.279* 5.808* 
  (4.147) (2.929) (2.963) (2.879) 
Drop in GDP 0.197 0.132 0.134 0.0556 
  (0.315) (0.340) (0.346) (0.338) 
Credit   -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Credit boom   4.033 3.808 3.273 
    (4.014) (4.825) (4.591) 
NPL   0.339** 0.329** 0.298** 
    (0.136) (0.142) (0.141) 
Concurrent currency crisis 12.10*** 6.128 6.035 6.753 
  (3.823) (5.221) (5.139) (5.509) 
Concurrent sovereign debt 
crisis -5.746 -5.028 -5.199 -5.916 
  (6.520) (7.583) (7.862) (7.628) 
GDP per capita     -0.0270   
      (0.136)   
OECD       -4.311 
        (5.761) 
Constant -5.726 -8.286** -7.811 -6.577 
  (5.107) (3.827) (4.670) (4.691) 
Observations 59 53 53 53 
R-squared 0.292 0.411 0.412 0.424 
Democracies only YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
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Table 6: Linear probability model for bank guarantees 
    
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
  LPM LPM LPM LPM LPM LPM LPM LPM LPM LPM Logit Probit 
Presidential system-
single-party -0.503*** -0.498*** -0.467*** -0.467*** -0.525*** -0.548*** -0.575*** -0.628*** -0.492*** -0.507** -3.134* -1.677** 
  (0.169) (0.169) (0.170) (0.170) (0.166) (0.170) (0.167) (0.175) (0.181) (0.194) (1.652) (0.752) 
Presidential system-
multiparty -0.555*** -0.528*** -0.452** -0.452** -0.496** -0.533*** -0.696*** -0.726*** -0.731*** -0.729*** -4.019** -2.226*** 
  (0.166) (0.166) (0.194) (0.194) (0.188) (0.184) (0.180) (0.228) (0.184) (0.185) (1.813) (0.855) 
Parliamentary system-
multiparty 0.031 0.019 0.019 0.019 -0.04 -0.036 -0.089 -0.091 -0.107 -0.100 -1.313 -0.659 
  (0.152) (0.146) (0.147) (0.147) (0.145) (0.142) (0.130) (0.135) (0.126) (0.125) (1.274) (0.653) 
Drop in GDP   0.015* 0.019** 0.019** 0.016* 0.013 0.007 0.008 0.011 0.013 0.049 0.024 
    (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.061) (0.034) 
Concurrent currency 
crisis     -0.181 -0.181 -0.175 -0.215 -0.0624 0.0398 0.0118 -0.0165 -0.874 -0.518 
      (0.131) (0.131) (0.134) (0.130) (0.161) (0.172) (0.166) (0.198) (0.990) (0.569) 
Concurrent sovereign 
debt crisis     0.069 0.069                 
      (0.251) (0.251)                 
Credit         0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014** 0.008** 
          (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.004) 
Credit boom           0.178 0.198* 0.115 0.207* 0.213* 2.261** 1.221** 
            (0.109) (0.106) (0.109) (0.107) (0.110) (1.143) (0.522) 
NPL             -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.017 -0.006 
              (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.040) (0.021) 
Government orientation               -0.015         
                -0.083         
Snap election                   -0.042     
                    (0.114)     
Constant 0.769*** 0.656*** 0.665*** 0.665*** 0.739*** 0.722*** 0.816*** 0.891*** 0.793*** 0.788*** 0.285 0.153 
  (0.121) (0.139) (0.137) (0.137) (0.129) (0.135) (0.136) (0.267) (0.137) (0.138) (1.386) (0.784) 
Observations 62 62 62 62 61 57 55 46 53 53 55 55 
R-squared 0.300 0.335 0.357 0.357 0.377 0.403 0.436 0.457 0.446 0.447     
Democracies only NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                     
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Further exploring whether our political economy factors are associated with the use of these policies, 
Table 6 shows the results for a linear probability model for bank guarantees. It shows that presidential 
systems (both single-party and multiparty) are less likely to use public guarantees when managing 
financial crises. These findings contribute to explaining the results found in Table 4 above, which 
show that presidential systems are associated with less fiscal costs of crisis management. We also 
test for alternative specifications (Probit and Logit models) and our main results hold, suggesting the 
significance of our results does not rest on the choice of econometric model. Our results are also 
robust to a battery of macroeconomic controls including Credit boom and GDP per capita. 
 
Table 7: Linear Probability Model for depositor losses 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  LPM LPM LPM LPM LPM Probit Logit 
Presidential system-
single-party 0.034 0.026 0.129 0.056 0.055 0.548 1.414 
  (0.144) (0.143) (0.141) (0.117) (0.128) (0.970) (2.516) 
Presidential system-
multiparty 0.346** 0.327* 0.409** 0.413** 0.417** 1.755* 3.448 
  (0.173) (0.172) (0.191) (0.197) (0.191) (1.045) (2.830) 
Parliamentary system-
multiparty -0.054 -0.046 0.080 0.075 0.125 0.895 1.929 
  (0.124) (0.128) (0.120) (0.129) (0.120) (1.013) (2.883) 
Drop in GDP   -0.01 -0.004 -0.007 -0.012 -0.018 -0.034 
    (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.043) (0.078) 
Credit     0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.004 
      (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.008) 
Concurrent currency 
crisis     0.105 0.0861 0.0336 0.103 0.129 
      (0.126) (0.137) (0.127) (0.544) (1.030) 
Credit boom     -0.076 -0.090       
      (0.097) (0.097)       
NPL     0.009* 0.008 0.010** 0.051*** 0.090** 
      (0.00503) (0.00525) (0.00406) (0.0187) (0.0367) 
Snap election         0.0319 -0.271 -0.441 
          (0.0782) (0.477) (1.072) 
Constant 0.154 0.233* -0.101 -0.044 -0.078 -2.646** -4.939* 
  (0.103) (0.125) (0.126) (0.125) (0.109) (1.053) (2.701) 
Observations 63 63 55 53 56 59 59 
R-squared 0.134 0.158 0.364 0.381 0.392     
Democracies only NO NO NO YES YES NO NO 
Robust standard errors in parentheses             
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1             
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 Table 7 and Table 8 show the results of linear probability models for depositor losses and bank 
recapitalisations respectively. Here, consistent with our main regression results and the subsequent 
analysis on the use of guarantees, presidential systems with multi-party governments are more likely 
to impose losses on depositors and less likely to use bank recapitalisations in the crisis management 
strategy. 
 
The results of our econometric investigation show that political factors indeed condition policy choice 
and hence impact the fiscal costs of financial crisis management. Our data suggest that this may not 
be due to the difference in the number of veto players in the political system, but rather to other 
elements such as the fact that in presidential systems, the executive is directly accountable to 
voters. This enhanced accountability to the electorate is clearly visible in both the policies that 
different governments use, and the fiscal costs associated with banking crises. 
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Table 8: Linear probability model for bank recapitalisation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  LPM LPM LPM LPM LPM Logit Probit Probit 
Presidential system-single-party -0.188* -0.240* -0.248* -0.255* -0.178 -18.10*** -5.510*** -5.677*** 
  (0.102) (0.126) (0.125) (0.129) (0.119) (1.836) (1.027) (1.357) 
Presidential system-multiparty -0.071 -0.077 -0.005 -0.012 -0.018 -15.89*** -4.244*** -4.026*** 
  (0.071) (0.072) (0.073) (0.076) (0.107) (1.753) (0.875) (1.303) 
Parliamentary system-multiparty 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.020       
  (0.002) (0.007) (0.023) (0.026) (0.031)       
Drop in GDP -0.000 -0.003 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.009 -0.005 -0.080 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.054) (0.030) (0.115) 
Concurrent currency crisis     -0.137 -0.141 -0.113 -2.037 -1.214 -3.100** 
      (0.085) (0.089) (0.129) (2.394) (1.159) (1.249) 
Credit         0.000 0.004 0.003 0.023* 
          (0.000) (0.007) (0.004) (0.013) 
Credit boom         -0.012 -0.206 -0.097 0.160 
          (0.086) (1.967) (0.812) (0.941) 
NPL         0.001 -0.013 -0.006 0.018 
          (0.002) (0.047) (0.024) (0.027) 
GDP per capita       -0.000         
        (0.001)         
Government orientation               1.404** 
                (0.644) 
Constant 1.001*** 1.024*** 1.032*** 1.044*** 1.000*** 20.42*** 6.823*** 4.225** 
  (0.0195) (0.0251) (0.0286) (0.0386) (0.0526) (2.524) (1.454) (2.009) 
Observations 63 60 59 58 53 35 35 29 
R-squared 0.101 0.139 0.204 0.204 0.131       
Democracies only NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses               
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                 
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7. Conclusion 
 
There is significant variance in how different countries deal with banking crises. Both theory and 
experience have led to ambiguous recommendations regarding ‘optimal’ policy responses because 
crises involve many coordination problems and are aggravated by institutional weaknesses 
(Claessens, Klingebiel and Laeven, 2005). Empirical research has largely focused on the 
‘effectiveness’ of specific policy tools with respect to their effect on output, or duration of crises 
(Honohan and Klingebiel, 2003; Homar and van Wijnbergen, 2013). However, intervention in financial 
crises requires political decisions. Whilst seemingly obvious, we know very little about how politics 
conditions policy choice in banking crises. Cross-country econometric analysis of how domestic 
institutions mediate pressures in times of crises, or shape policy responses, can help decipher the 
constraints which decision-makers are under when designing strategies and responding to crises. 
 
In this paper we attempted to quantitatively estimate the impact that select political variables have on 
policy choice and hence the fiscal costs of banking crises. We find that both single-party and multi-
party governments in presidential systems are associated with lower fiscal costs of crisis 
management. Looking at crisis containment strategies, we further show that these governments are 
less likely to use guarantees that would expose the state to significant contingent and direct fiscal 
liabilities are and less likely to use bank recapitalisations in their crisis management strategy. Not 
using these tools in their banking crisis management strategy limits the state’s fiscal exposure. 
Finally we show presidential systems with multiparty governments are more likely to impose losses 
on depositors. 
 
Our results raise many questions for future research. The limitations outlined in section 4 clearly 
show the need for better data to enhance our understanding of the links between systemic financial 
crisis and political variables. More analysis of the link between policy choice and fiscal cost resulting 
from a crisis, as well as the channels through which our findings occur could be interesting to explore. 
 
Nonetheless, our empirical results have important implications for the understanding of financial 
crisis policy-making. Decision-making during financial crisis occurs under a lot of uncertainty and it is 
clear that financial crises upset old political economy equilibria. Therefore, a greater understanding of 
the impact that institutions and politics have on policy choices may allow us to better understand and 
predict decision-making in times of financial stress. 
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Appendix I: Definition of banking crises episodes 
 
Following Laeven and Valencia, we define a banking crisis episode if two conditions are met: 
1. Significant signs of financial distress in the banking system (as indicated by significant bank 
runs, losses in the banking system and/or bank liquidations. 
2.  Significant banking policy intervention measures in response to significant losses in the 
banking system. 
 
Moreover, significant policy intervention is considered when at least three of the following policies are 
undertaken: 
1. extensive liquidity support (5 percent of deposits and liabilities to non-residents) 
2. bank restructuring gross costs (at least 3 percent of GDP) 
3. significant bank nationalisations 
4. significant guarantees put in place 
5. significant asset purchases (at least 5 percent of GDP) 
6. deposit freezes and/or bank holidays. 
 
In the past, however, some countries intervened in their financial sectors using a combination of less 
than three of these measures, but on a large scale (for example, by nationalising all major banks in 
the country). Therefore, Laeven and Valencia consider a sufficient condition for a crisis episode to be 
deemed systemic when either: 
1. a country’s banking system exhibits significant losses resulting in a share of nonper- forming 
loans above 20 percent, or bank closures of at least 20 percent of banking system assets, or 
2. fiscal restructuring costs of the banking sector are sufficiently high, exceeding 5 percent of 
GDP. 
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 Appendix II: Construction of LIEC and Checks and Balances 
 
Legislative and Executive Indices of Electoral Competitiveness (LIEC) (see Beck et al, 2001, 2012, codebook 
p14)  
Legislative IEC Scale: No legislature: 1 
Unelected legislature: 2 
Elected, 1 candidate: 3 
1 party, multiple candidates: 4 
multiple parties are legal but only one party won seats: 5 
multiple parties won seats but the largest party received more than 75% of the seats: 6  
largest party got less than 75%: 7 
Checks and Balances (see Beck et al, 2001, 2012, codebook, p18-19) 
 
Checks and Balances equals one if LIEC OR (the Beck et al, 2012, Executive Index of Electoral Competition) EIEC 
is less than 6 (5 for CHECKS_LAX) – countries where legislatures are not competitively elected are considered 
countries where only the executive wields a check. 
 
In countries where LIEC and EIEC are greater than or equal to 6 (5 for CHECKS_LAX): Checks and Balances is 
incremented by one if there is a chief executive (it is blank or NA if not). 
 
Checks and Balances is incremented by one if the chief executive is competitively elected (EIEC greater than 
six). 
 
Checks and Balances is incremented by one if the opposition controls the legislature. In presidential systems, 
Checks and Balances is incremented by one: 
 
for each chamber of the legislature UNLESS the president’s party has a majority in the lower house AND 
a closed list system is in effect (implying stronger presidential control of his/her party, and therefore of 
the legislature). 
for each chamber of the legislature UNLESS the president’s party has a majority in the lower house AND 
a closed list system is in effect (implying stronger presidential control of his/her party, and therefore of 
the legislature). 
In parliamentary systems, Checks and Balances is incremented by one 
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 for every party in the government coalition as long as the parties are needed to maintain a majority (the 
previous version of CHECKS – Checks3 in DPI3 – incremented by one for each of the three largest 
parties in the government coalition, regardless of whether they were needed for a legislative majority). 
for every party in the government coalition that has a position on economic issues (right- left-center) 
closer to the largest opposition party than to the party of the executive. 
In parliamentary systems, the prime minister’s party is not counted as a check if there is a closed rule 
in place – the prime minister is presumed in this case to control the party fully. 
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 Appendix III: Banking Crises 1970–2011 
Country Start End Country Start End Country Start End 
Albania 1994 1994 Equatorial Guinea 1983 1983 Nicaragua 2000 2001 
Algeria 1990 1994 Eritrea 1993 1993 Niger 1983 1985 
Argentina 1980 1982 Estonia 1992 1994 Nigeria 1991 1995 
Argentina 1989 1991 Finland 1991 1995 Nigeria 2009 ongoing 
Argentina 1995 1995 France 2008 ongoing Norway 1991 1993 
Argentina 2001 2003 Georgia 1991 1995 Panama 1988 1989 
Armenia 1994 1994 Germany 2008 ongoing Paraguay 1995 1995 
Austria 2008 ongoing Ghana 1982 1983 Peru 1983 1983 
Azerbaijan 1995 1995 Greece 2008 ongoing Philippines 1983 1986 
Bangladesh 1987 1987 Guinea 1985 1985 Philippines 1998 2001 
Belarus 1995 1995 Guinea 1993 1993 Poland 1992 2001 
Belgium 2008 ongoing Guinea-Bissau 1995 1998 Portugal 2008 ongoing 
Benin 1988 1992 Guyana 1993 1993 Romania 1990 992 
Bolivia 1986 1986 Haiti 1994 1998 Russia 1998 1998 
Bolivia 1994 1994 Hungary 1991 1995 Russia 2008 ongoing 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992 1996 Hungary 2008 ongoing Sao Tome & Principe 1992 1992 
Brazil 1990 1994 Iceland 2008 ongoing Senegal 1988 1991 
Brazil 1994 1998 India 1993 1993 Sierra Leone 1990 1994 
Bulgaria 1996 1997 Indonesia 1997 2001 Slovak Rep 1998 2002 
Burkina Faso 1990 1994 Ireland 2008 ongoing Slovenia 1992 1992 
Burundi 1994 1998 Israel 1977 1977 Slovenia 2008 ongoing 
Cameroon 1987 1991 Jamaica 1996 1998 Spain 1977 1981 
Cameroon 1995 1997 Japan 1997 2001 Sri Lanka 1989 1991 
Cape Verde 1993 1993 Jordan 1989 1991 Swaziland 1995 1999 
Central African Republic 1976 1976 Kazakhstan 2008 ongoing Sweden 1991 1995 
Central African Republic 1995 1996 Kenya 1985 1985 Sweden 2008 ongoing 
Chad 1983 1983 Kenya 1992 1994 Switzerland 2008 ongoing 
Chad 1992 1996 South Korea 1997 1998 Tanzania 1987 1988 
Chile 1976 1976 Kuwait 1982 1985 Thailand 1983 1983 
Chile 1981 1985 Kyrgyz Republic 1995 1999 Thailand 1997 2000 
China 1998 1998 Latvia 1995 1996 Togo 1993 1994 
Colombia 1982 1982 Latvia 2008 ongoing Tunisia 1991 1991 
Colombia 1998 2000 Lebanon 1990 1993 Turkey 1982 1984 
Congo, Dem Rep 1983 1983 Liberia 1991 1995 Turkey 2000 2001 
Congo, Dem Rep 1991 1994 Lithuania 1995 1996 Uganda 1994 1994 
Congo, Dem Rep 1994 1998 Luxembourg 2008 ongoing Ukraine 1998 1999 
Congo, Rep 1992 1994 Macedonia, FYR 1993 1995 Ukraine 2008 ongoing 
Costa Rica 1987 1991 Madagascar 1988 1988 United Kingdom 2007 ongoing 
Costa Rica 1994 1995 Malaysia 1997 1999 United States 1988 1988 
Cote d’Ivoire 1998 1992 Mali 1987 1991 United States 2007 ongoing 
Croatia 1998 1999 Mauritania 1984 1984 Uruguay 1981 1985 
Czech Republic 1996 2000 Mexico 1981 1985 Uruguay 2002 2005 
Denmark 2008 ongoing Mexico 1994 1996 Venezuela 1994 1998 
Djibouti 1991 1995 Mongolia 2008 ongoing Vietnam 1997 1997 
Dominican Republic 2003 2004 Morocco 1980 1984 Yemen 1996 1996 
Ecuador 1982 1986 Mozambique 1987 1991 Zambia 1995 1998 
Ecuador 1998 2002 Nepal 1988 1988 Zimbabwe 1995 1999 
Egypt 1980 1980 Netherlands 2008 ongoing    
El Salvador 1989 1990 Nicaragua 1990 1993    
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Appendix IV: List of variables used 
Variable 
 
Source 
 
Note 
 Crisis duration 
  
Laeven and Valencia (2012) 
    
Years 
 Fiscal Costs (% of 
GDP) 
WEO, IFS, IMF Staff reports, 
Laeven and Valencia (2008), and 
authors’ calculation. 
Fiscal costs are defined as the component of gross 
fiscal outlays related to the restructuring of the 
financial sector. They include fiscal costs 
associated with bank recapitalizations but exclude 
asset purchases and direct liquidity assistance 
from the treasury. 
Liquidity support WEO, IFS, IMF Staff reports, 
Laeven and Valencia (2008), and 
authors’ calculation. 
Percentage points increase in central bank claims 
on financial institutions over deposits and foreign 
liabilities. 
Monetary expansion WEO, IFS, IMF Staff reports, 
Laeven and Valencia (2008), and 
authors’ calculation. 
In percent of GDP. Monetary expansion is computed 
as the change in the monetary base between its 
peak during the crisis and its level one year prior to 
the crisis. 
Credit World Bank Averaged over the three pre-crisis years, domestic 
credit provided by the banking sector includes all 
credit to various sectors on a gross basis, with the 
exception of credit to the central government, which 
is net. The banking sector includes monetary 
authorities and deposit taking banks, as well as 
other banking institutions where data available 
(including institutions that do not accept 
transferable deposits but do incur such liabilities as 
time and savings deposits) 
Credit boom WEO, IFS, IMF Staff reports, 
Laeven and Valencia (2008), and 
authors’ calculation 
As defined in Dell’Ariccia et al (2012). 
Form of government World Bank - DPI2012 Parliamentary (2), Assembly-elected President (1), 
Presidential (0) 
Government 
orientation 
World Bank - DPI2012 Right (1); Left (3); Centre (2); No information (0); 
No executive (NA) 
Legislative Index of 
Electoral 
Competitiveness 
(LIEC) 
World Bank - DPI2012 No legislature: 1; Unelected legislature: 2; Elected, 1 
candidate: 3; 1 party, multiple candidates: 4; 
multiple parties are legal but only one party won 
seats: 5; multiple parties did win seats but the 
largest party received more than 75% of the seats: 
6; largest party got less than 75%: 7. 
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Years to next 
election 
World Bank - DPI2012 Only full years are counted. Thus, a “0” is scored in 
an election year. 
Degree of checks 
 
World Bank - DPI2012 Degree of checks and balances, from 1 to 7. 
Snap elections held 
during the crisis 
World Bank - DPI2015, own 
calculations. 
Cumulative number of snap executive elections 
held during the crisis years // The executive who 
formally (de jure) holds power is counted. 
GDP per capita IMF, WEO Gross Domestic Product divided by midyear 
population. Data are taken in current U.S. dollars 
taken at t-1 
Concurrent currency 
crisis 
Laeven and Valencia (2012) Definition based on Frankel and Rose (1996) 
Concurrent debt 
crisis 
Laeven and Valencia (2012) Episodes of sovereign debt default and 
restructuring compiled relying on information from 
Beim and Calomiris (2001), World Bank (2002), 
Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006), IMF Staff 
reports, and reports from rating agencies. 
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